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Summary
Security protocols play more and more important role with widely use in many applications nowa-
days. They are designed to provide security properties for users who want to exchange messages
over unsecured medium. Currently, there are many tools for specifying and verifying security proto-
cols such as Casper/FDR, ProVerif or AVISPA. In these tools, the knowledge of participants, which
is useful to reason about some security properties, is not included in the model. The intruder's
ability, which is either needed to be specied explicitly or set by default, is not exible in some
circumstances. Moreover, whereas most of the existing tools focus on secrecy and authentication
properties, few supports privacy properties like anonymity, receipt freeness and coercion resistance,
which are crucial in many applications such as in electronic voting systems or anonymous online
transactions. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no automatic tool using formal methods to
verify security protocols related to receipt freeness and coercion resistance properties.
In this thesis, we introduce a framework for specifying security protocols in the Labeled Transition
System (LTS) semantics model, which embeds the knowledge of the participants and parameterizes
the ability of attacker. Using this model, we give the formal denitions for three types of privacy
properties based on trace equivalence and knowledge reasoning. The formal denitions for some
other security properties such as secrecy and authentication are introduced under this framework,
and the verication algorithms are given as well.
The results of this thesis are embodied in the implementation of a SeVe module in PAT model
checker, which supports specifying, simulating and verifying security protocols. The tool is built
towards supporting automatic verication: the users only need to specify the security protocols us-
ing SeVe language (which is introduced to ease the user from specifying security protocols), the tool
will automatically generate the system behaviors and the verication results are given by just one
click. The experimental results show that SeVe module is capable of verifying many types of secu-
rity protocols and complements the state-of-the-art security veriers in several aspects. Moreover,
it also proves the ability in building an automatic verier for security protocols related to privacy
type, which are mostly veried by hand now.
Key words: Formal Verication, Security Protocols, Model Checking, PAT, Authentication,
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1.1 Motivation and Goals
With the explosion of the Internet, electronic transactions have become more and more common.
The security for these transactions is very crucial to many applications, e.g. electronic commerce,
digital contract signing, electronic voting, and so on. However, these large open networks where
trusted and untrusted parties coexist and where messages transit through potentially dangerous en-
vironment pose new challenges to the designers of communication protocols. Properties such as
authenticity, condentiality, proof of identity, proof of delivery, or receipt are difcult to assure in
this scenario. Security protocols, communications protocols using cryptographic primitives, aim at
solving this problem. By a suitable use of shared and public key cryptography, random numbers,
hash functions, encrypted and plain messages, a security protocol may assure security requirements
for the participants.
Surprisingly, the informal specication of security protocols is usually simple and easy to under-
stand. However, it provides an incomplete description of the actions of principals engaged in the
protocol execution. Namely, it describes only the actions taken in a complete protocol run between
honest principals. In contrast, it does not describe what happens during unsuccessful runs, for exam-
ple, with possibly untrusted participants. Moreover, even in successful runs, certain checks must be
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taken and execution will abort when the checks fail. Thus, the formal methods in specication and
verication for security protocols have became the subject of intense research. For instance, meth-
ods based on beliefs logics [7] [42], theorem proving with induction [19][13], and state exploration
methods [25] have been successfully used to verify and debug security protocols. However, these
approaches lack automation and therefore are hard to apply in practical use. In addition, the veri-
cation of security protocols is also a real challenge. With the complicated combination and parallel
of protocol sessions, the complexity of verication should be considered. With all of those require-
ments, there is a demand for automatic tool which is able to help to specify and verify security
protocols correctly and sufciently. In this thesis, we aim to develop an automatic security verier
based on proposing framework using Label Transition System model and knowledge reasoning to
solve this problem.
Currently, there are many established tools to formally specify and verify security protocols such
as Casper/FDR [12], ProVerif [6] or AVISPA [3], but mostly focus on authentication and secrecy
properties. Anonymity and privacy properties which take an important role in many protocols get
less attention from study. The user may require anonymity and privacy guarantees to many trans-
actions, such as anonymity of payment, privacy of shopping preference, or candidate choice in an
election. Recently, some research on verifying privacy properties using applied Pi-calculus [8] [34]
and epistemic logics [14] [17] have been proposed. However, most of these studies require hand
proving in verication, especially in receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance properties. An effec-
tive automatic tool to verify security protocols related to privacy properties still poses a challenge.
This is also a goal for our study.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The main results of this thesis are embodied in the design and implementation of SeVe module, a
self-contained framework for the automatic analysis of security protocols. The contributions of this
thesis can be summarized as follows:
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² We propose a framework for specifying and verifying security protocols using Label Tran-
sition System model. Besides the behaviors of agents and intruder, the knowledge of par-
ticipants, which proves effective to reason about security properties, are also included in the
model. The intruder's abilities are parameterized for exible choices in different environ-
ments.
² We propose an approach for the integration of trace equivalence checking and knowledge
reasoning to formally dene and check privacy properties. By using this approach, we can
automatically verify privacy properties, especially with receipt freeness and coercion resis-
tance properties. Our tool is the rst tool applying formal methods to automatically check
these two properties.
² We develop SeVe module, an automatic tool to support specication, simulation and veri-
cation of security protocols. SeVe is designed to support automatic verication for not only
some common security properties such as secrecy and authentication but also for other prop-
erties such as anonymity and privacy.
1.3 Thesis Outline and Overview
In this section, we briey present the outline of the thesis and overview of each chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces the background of security protocols, attacker model and security goals. It also
gives a review of past and current research on specication and verication of security protocols.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the system semantics of security protocols using Label Transition System
model. They include the agent and intruder rules, the formalization of security properties such as
secrecy, authentication and privacy.
In Chapter 4, we proposed the verication algorithms used in checking security protocols. The
architecture and implementation of SeVe module are given as well.
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Chapter 5 demonstrates two case studies: Needham Schroeder public key protocols with authentica-
tion property, and Fujioka electronic voting protocol with privacy property. This chapter also gives
the experimental results for some classical security protocols.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and highlights some possible future research directions.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction about security protocol
As with many other protocols, security protocol describes the sequence of interactions between par-
ties for a certain end. Security protocols use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure some goals:
authentication of parties, establishing session keys between parties, ensuring secrecy, integrity,
anonymity, non-repudiation and so on. We will introduce some cryptographic mechanisms shortly.
2.1.1 Some concepts about cryptographic mechanisms
Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
An asymmetric encryption scheme is composed of three algorithms: the key generation algorithm,
the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm. As we consider asymmetric cryptography,
the key generation algorithm produces a pair of keys containing a public key pk and the related
secret key sk . The public key is used for encryption and can be disclosed to anyone whereas the
secret key is used for decryption and must remain private.
The encryption algorithm transforms a message m called plain-text into a message c called the
5
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Figure 2.1: Asymmetric encryption scheme
cipher-text. The encryption of plain-text m using public key pk is denoted by: c = enc(m; pk ) =
fmgpk .
The decryption algorithm takes as input a cipher-text c and a private key sk and outputs the plain-
text if the key used for encryption was pk . In order to show the link between pk and sk , the se-
cret key related to public key pk can be denoted by p¡1k . p
¡1
k is the inverse key of pk . Then
dec(enc(m; pk ); sk ) = m . The idea beyond asymmetric cryptography is that everyone can encrypt
a message using the public key. This can be viewed as posting a letter in a box. But to decrypt a
cipher-text, the secret key is required: to get the letter from the box, you must have its key.
Symmetric Encryption Schemes
Asymmetric encryption schemes have a major disadvantage: algorithms are in general very slow to
apply. Symmetric encryption allows faster encryptions and decryptions but there is only a single
shared encryption and decryption key. Therefore, the key has to be exchanged before using sym-
metric encryption. A typical use of asymmetric encryption consists in generating a fresh symmetric
key and using the public key to encrypt it and send it securely. After that, encryption using the fresh
symmetric keys can be used.
A symmetric encryption scheme is similar to an asymmetric encryption scheme. It is composed
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Figure 2.2: Symmetric encryption scheme
of three algorithms: the key generation algorithm, the encryption algorithm and the decryption al-
gorithm. The difference with asymmetric cryptography is that the key generation algorithm only
outputs a single key k instead of a key pair. This key is used by both encryption and decryption:
dec(enc(m; k); k) = m . Symmetric cryptography can be seen as asymmetric cryptography where
the inverse of a key is itself: k = k¡1.
Random Number Generators
Random numbers are used to ensure freshness of a message. These numbers are also called nonces
(for numbers used once). They are generated using a random number generator. A generator is an
algorithm that outputs such random numbers. As true randomness is difcult to achieve, pseudo-
random number generators are commonly used instead.
2.1.2 Describing security protocols
Protocols describe the messages sent between honest participants during a session. A session is a
single run of the protocol. Most protocols allow multiple concurrent sessions. Participant of the
session are called agents and are usually denoted A (for Alice) and B (for Bob). A third participant I
(for Intruder) represents the adversary who tries to break the protocol (for example by getting some
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secret information).
The difculty of designing and analyzing security protocols has long been recognized. This dif-
culty arises from the following reasons:
² These protocols inhabit a complex, hostile environment. To evaluate them properly, we need
to be able accurately describe and model this environment and this will have to include the
capabilities of agents trying to undermine the protocol.
² The properties they are supposed to ensure are sometimes subtle. The precise meaning of
some concepts remains debated.
² Capturing the capabilities of "intruders" is inevitably difcult.
² Security protocols involve a high degree of concurrency which makes analysis more challeng-
ing.
To make things rather more concrete, let us consider an example: the Needham Schroeder public
key protocol [29]. This protocol involves two agents A and B.
Message1 : A! B : fA;NAgpkB
Message2 : B ! A : fNA;NBgpkA
Message3 : A! B : fNBgpkB
These lines describe a correct execution of one session of the protocol. Each line of the protocol
corresponds to the emission of a message by an agent (A for the rst line) and a reception of this
message by another agent (B for the rst line).
In line 1, the agent A is the initiator of the session. Agent B is the responder. Agent A sends to
B her identity and a freshly generated nonce NA, both encrypted using the public key of B, pkB .
Agent B receives the message, decrypts it using his secret key to obtain the identity of the initiator
and the nonce NA.
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In line 2, B sends back to A a message containing the nonce NA that B just received and a freshly
generated nonce NB . Both are encrypted using the public key of A, pkA. The initiator A receives
the message and decrypts it, A veries that the rst nonce corresponds to the nonce she sent to B in
line 1 and obtains nonce NB .
In line 3, A sends to B the nonceNB she just received encrypted with the public key of B. B receives
the message and decrypts it. Then B checks that the received nonce corresponds to NB .
The goal of this protocol is to provide authentication of A and B. When the session ends, agent A is
sure that she was talking to B and agent B is sure that he was talking to A. To ensure this property,
when A decodes the second message, she veries that the person she is talking to correctly put NA
in it. As NA was encrypted by the public key of B in the rst message, only B could infer the value
of NA. When B decodes the third message, he veries that the nonce is NB . As NB only circulated
encrypted by the public key of A, A is the only agent that could have deduced NB . For these two
reasons, A thinks that she was talking to B and B thinks that she was talking to A.
2.1.3 Security properties
There are many security properties in literature. In this part, we will examine some properties such
as secrecy, authentication, anonymity, receipt freeness and coercion resistance.
Secrecy property
The secrecy property concerns a message used by the protocol. This message is typically a nonce or
a secret key that should not become public at the end of the protocol. The word "public" may have
two different meanings: a message can be public if the adversary is able to show its value or it can
be public as soon as the adversary is able to distinguish this message from a randomly generated
message. Hence, there are (at least) two distinct types for the secrecy property:
² Weak Secrecy: in this case, the adversary should not be able to derive the whole message or a
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part of message we want to keep secret. It can also be used in the computational setting even
if strong secrecy makes more sense in this context.
² Strong Secrecy: here, the adversary should not be able to deduce any information on the
secret, for example, the property implies that an adversary should not be able to distinguish
an execution where a random bit-string value bs0 is used from an execution where another
random bit-string value bs1 is used, even if the adversary knows or chooses bs0 and bs1.
In most cases, it is sufcient to guarantee the weak secret, i.e. to prevent the intruder from being
to derive the plain text of the message passing between the honest agents. In this thesis, the term
"secrecy" is referred to "weak secrecy". We can capture this by checking whether the knowledge
representing this secret information are leak at the end of the protocol. That information might be
leaked during the learning of the intruder: he gets the message, understands the contents of the
messages directly or using his private key to decrypt the message encrypted under his public and
learn some new knowledge.
Authentication property
Entity authentication is concerned with verication of an entity's claimed identity. An authenti-
cation protocol provides an agent B with a mechanism to achieve this: an exchange of messages
that establishes that the other party A has also been involved in the protocol run. This provides au-
thentication of A to B: an assurance is provided to B that some communication has occurred with A.
Privacy-type properties
There are three types of privacy-type properties in literature: anonymity (or untraceability), receipt
freeness and coercion resistance.
² Anonymity: the intruder cannot determine which information was sent by the agent.
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² Receipt freeness: the agent does not gain any receipt which can be used to prove to the
intruder that the agent sent a particular information.
² Coercion resistance: the agent cannot cooperate with the intruder to prove to him that the
agent sent particular information.
Of course, the agent can tell the intruder the information he sent, but unless the agent provides
convincing evidence, otherwise the intruder cannot believe him. Receipt freeness and coercion
resistance guarantee that the agent cannot provide such evidence.
2.1.4 Attacking security protocol
There are many kinds of attacking security protocol. In this part, we introduce some well-known
strategies that an intruder might employ.
Man-in-the-middle
This style of attack involves the intruder imposing himself between the communications between
the sender and receiver. If the protocol is purely designed he may be able to subvert it in various
ways; in particular he may be able to forge as receiver to sender, for example. To illustrate this, we
consider a simple protocol in which Alice wants to send a secret message X to Bob using public-key
technique but Alice and Bob do not even need to know each other's public key. Using an algorithm
like RSA, for which encryption and decryption are inverse and commutative, the protocol is:
Alice sends Bob a message X encrypted with Alice's public key:
Message1 : Alice ! Bob : fX gPkAlice
When Bob receives this message, he cannot decrypt it as only Alice can do this. Bob then encrypts
it using his public key and sends to Alice:
Message2 : Bob ! Alice : ffX gPkAlicegPkBob
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Using the commutative property of RSA, we have:
ffX gPkAlicegPkBob = ffX gPkBobgPkAlice
So now Alice can decryption the message ffX gPkBobgPkAlice and get fX gPkBob and send it back to
Bob
Message3 : Alice ! Bob : fX gPkBob
Now only Bob can decrypt this message and get X. At rst glance, this protocol seems secure as only
Alice and Bob can decrypt message encrypted their public key using their private key. However, it
turns out that the intruder can easily defeat it by intercepting the messages between Alice and Boob
and inserting some of his own. The attack works as following:
Intruder intercepts the message 1 and applies his public key encryption:
ffX gPkAlicegPkIntruder
The intruder returns this message to Alice and Alice has no way of knowing that this is not the
expecting reply from Bob. So she simply does decryption according to the protocol and sends back
to Bob: fX gPkIntruder . Now the intruder again intercept the message, decrypt using his private's key
and get the message X.
This attack arises due to the lack of authentication in this protocol: Alice has no way to check the
message she gets is from Bob.
Replay
The intruder monitors a run of the protocol and at some later time replays one or more of the mes-
sages. If the protocol does not have the mechanism to distinguish between separate runs or to detect
the staleness of a message, it is possible to fool the honest agents into rerunning all or parts of the
protocol. Devices like nonces, identiers for runs and timestamps are used to try to foil such attacks.
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Interleave
This is the most ingenious style of attack in which the intruder contrives for two or more runs of
the protocol to overlap. Let look at the Needham Schroeder protocol given before. Consider the
following attack (with I is the intruder):
Message a1 : A! I : fA;NAgPkI
Message b1 : I (A)! B : fA;NAgPkB
Message b2 : B ! I (A) : fNA;NBgPkA
Message a2 : I ! A : fNA;NBgPkA
Message a3 : A! I : fNBgPkI
Message b3 : I (A)! B : fNBgPkB
Note that in this attack, intruder I is actually a recognized user, that is he is known to the other users
and has a certicated public key. Alice starts a protocol run with the intruder I, thinking that he is
a trust user. However, the intruder does not respond to Alice as the expected way. He used Alice's
nonce to initiate another run with Bob but inserting Alice's name instead of his own. The notation
I(A) denotes I generating the message, but pretending that it comes from A. Bob responds with his
nonce NB but he will encrypt it with Alice's public key as he thinks that he is contacting with Alice.
This is exactly Alice is expecting from Intruder and she proceeds the next step: she decrypts it and
send a message back to I containingNB encrypted by I's public key. I now can decrypt this message
and get NB . Intruder I then construct the nal message of the run he initiated with Bob: encrypt NB
under Bob's public key.
At the end of this, we have two interleaved runs of the protocol with Intruder sitting in the middle.
Alice thinks that she and Intruder share knowledge of NA and NB . Bob thinks that he is running
the protocol with Alice. Thus, the Intruder has created the mismatch in Alice and Bob's perception.
The above section gives an idea about the variety and subtlety of the attacks to which protocols may
be vulnerable.
There are many other known styles of attack and presumably many more that have yet to be dis-
covered. Many involve combinations of these themes. This demonstrates the difculty in designing
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security protocols and emphasizes the need for a formal and rigorous analysis of these protocols.
2.2 Related Work
There are many research work on verication of security protocols. In this part, we will summary
some related works on security verier tools as well as formalization and verication of privacy
properties.
2.2.1 Security verier tools
The formal methods in specication and verication for security protocols have became the subject
of intense research. For instance, methods based on beliefs logics [7] [42], theorem proving with
induction [19][13], and state exploration methods [25] have been successfully used to verify and
debug security protocols. However, these approaches lack automation and therefore are hard to
apply in practical use. In addition, the verication of security protocols is also a real challenge.
Method for analyzing security protocols using the process algebra CSP [15] has been developed in
[35] [12]. An advantage of using process algebra for modeling security protocols is that the model
is easily extended. This technique has proved successful, and has been used to discover a number
of attacks upon protocols [33] [36]. However, it has required producing a CSP description of the
protocol by hand; this has proved tedious and error-prone. Developed originally by Gavin Lowe, the
Casper/FDR tool set as described in [12] automatically produces the CSP description from a more
abstract description, thus greatly simplies the modeling and analysis process. The user species the
protocol using a more abstract notation, similar to the notation appearing in the academic literature,
and Casper compiles this into CSP code, suitable for checking using FDR. However, Casper only
supplies a few forms of specication for protocols, mostly focuses on authentication and secrecy,
not for other security properties such as anonymity and privacy. The intruder ability is set by default;
therefore, the user can not have the exible choice when modeling system in different environments.
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OFMC [5] and CL-Atse [45] are two tools developed in AVISPA project [3]. Both these tools
take the same input language called HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specication Language) [28].
However, the declaration using HLPSL is quite complicated and the transition states for each step
need to be specied, so the specication job is quite tricky. With the large number of participants,
the OFMC and CL-Atse may not terminate. Like Casper, the user cannot vary the intruder ability in
verication.
ProVerif [6] is an automatic cryptographic protocol verier in the formal model (so called Dolev-
Yao model). The input of this tool is Pi-Calculus description [2]. Then this description is translated
into Horn clauses for verication. ProVerif can handle many different cryptographic primitives and
an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol and message space. However, specifying security
protocols using Pi-Calculus is not an easy task as the users need to specify explicitly intruder's
behaviors. Also the intruder's ability cannot be changed.
2.2.2 Research on privacy verication
There are many established tools to formally specify and verify security protocols as introduced
above, but mostly focus on authentication and secrecy properties. Anonymity and privacy properties
which take an important role in many protocols get less attention from study. The user may require
anonymity and privacy guarantees to many transactions, such as anonymity of payment, privacy of
shopping preference, or candidate choice in an election.
The idea of formalizing anonymity as some kinds of process equivalence in process algebra is
rst proposed in the work of Schneider and Sidiropoulos [32]. However, only anonymity check-
ing is introduced in this paper. Fournet and Abadi [11] model the security protocols using applied
pi-calculus and observe the observational equivalence in process calculus to prove the anonymity.
Similar idea has been used by Mauw et al. [34], Kremer and Ryan [18]. Again, only anonymity
is investigated. The work of Delaune, Kremer and Ryan [8] give rst formal methods denition of
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, two other types of privacy properties, in applied pi calcu-
lus. In this approach, the authors use forward channel and bisimulation to capture the condition for
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these two privacy properties, while in our approach, we use knowledge based reasoning and trace
equivalence to dene the condition for them. Reasoning about bisimulation in this approach is rather
informal and mainly by hand. Michael et.al [43] present a general technique for modeling remote
voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus by giving a new denition of coercion-resistance in terms
of observational equivalence. However, this approach requires human effort to transform process
specications into biprocesses, which is not always straightforward. The applied Pi Calculus ap-
proach is also used by Naipeng et.al [10]. Whereas the anonymity checking is done automatically
in this study, the receipt freeness property is still checked manually.
Halpern [14] and Jonker [17] propose the formalizations of anonymity based on epistemic logics.
The authors give a logical characterization of the notion of receipt in electronic voting processes.
However, these formalisms mainly focus on reasoning about the property and are less suited for
modeling the protocol as well as attacker abilities. In addition, their logics aim to expressing prop-
erties rather than operational steps of a protocol. Thus, modeling protocols using epistemic-logic
requires a high degree of expertise and easily get errors. J. Pang and C. Zhang [27] also model
security protocols using epistemic logics and use MCMAS model checker to automatically verify.
However, only anonymity property is investigated in their study.
Chapter 3
System semantics
Security protocols describe the message terms sent between trusted participants during a session. A
session is a single run of the protocol. Most protocols allow multiple concurrent sessions. Partici-
pants of the session are called agents. The environment in which the sender and receiver commu-
nicate is an unsecured environment. This unreliable environment is modeled by adding an intruder
into the network, who is given special powers to tamper with the messages that pass around. Our
approach follows the Dolev-Yao model [9] as in Figure 3.1. The system is the interleaving of agents
and intruder activities:
System = (jjjX2fAgentg¤ AgentX ) jjj Intruder , where jjj denotes for interleaving.
Basic sets. We start with the basic sets: C is set of constants, such as nonce, session key; F is set of
function names, such as hash function, bit scheme schema); A is set of participants, including AT
denotes for trusted agents andAU denotes for untrusted agent (intruder). In table 3.2 we show some
typical elements of these sets, as used throughout this paper.
Term. We dene the set of Term as the basic term sets, extended with constructors for pairing and
encryption, and we assume that pairing is right-associative.
Term ::= A j C j F(Term) j (Term;Term) j fTermgTerm
17
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Agent A Agent B
Agent C Agent D
Agent I
Intruder
Figure 3.1: Dolev-Yao model
Description Set Typical elements
Constants C na,nb,session key
Trusted agents AT Alice,Bob, Carol
Untrusted agents AU Jeeves
Functions F kas,kbs,hash
Figure 3.2: Basic sets and some typical elements
The encryption is the special form of function. However, due to the high frequently use of encrypted
message, we make it as a special case of term for easily understanding. Terms that have been
encrypted with a term, can only be decrypted by either the same term (for symmetric encryption)
or the inverse key (for asymmetric encryption). To determine which term needs to be known to
decrypt a term, we introduce a function that yields the inverse for any term: ¡1 : Term ! Term .
For example, if pk and sk are public key and private key of an agent correspondingly, we have:
pk¡1 = sk . Similarly, if k is a session key, we have: s¡1 = s .
Chapter 3. System semantics 19
We require that ¡1 is its own inverse, i.e. (t¡1)¡1 = t . Terms are reduces according to ffsgtgt¡1 =
s .
Denition 1 (Message) Message used in the security model has the form: Message ::= sender £
receiver £ term , where sender 2 A, receiver 2 A and term 2 Term.
We now turn to describe the protocol behaviors. The protocol is described as set of events, i.e. the
send and read events, between agents. We also have other behaviors of intruder such as deect,
inject, eavesdrop and jam. Their semantics are given in Chapter 3.1.
Denition 2 (Security events) The set of events used to describe the security protocol behaviors
are dened as:
RunEvent = fsend(m); read(m); asend(m); aread(m); usend(m); uread(m);
de°ect(m); inject(m); eavesdrop(m); jam(m);
start(s; r); commit(s; r) j m 2 Message; s; r 2 Ag.
Denition 3 (Security process) A security process is dened as the following BNF, where P and
Q range over processes, e is a security event.
P = Stop j Skip  primitives
j e ! P  event prexing
j P [ ]Q  general choice
j P jjj Q  interleave composition
j P k Q  parallel composition
j P ; Q  sequential composition
Each agent or intruder has his own knowledge which is dened at the beginning of protocol. During
protocol run, the participants can learn and enhance their knowledge. We denoteK is the knowledge
of participants upon the running of the system. K : A ! ST , is the function mapped from set of
agentsA to set of terms ST . The messages are sent and read via an unsecured environment. We use
the set B of messages as the buffer representing this environment.
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Denition 4 (System conguration) A system conguration is a 3-element state s = hK ;P ;Bi,
where K is the knowledge of agents, P is the running process, B is the buffer of the messages. At the
initial state of the system, buffer is empty and the program starts at the System root, thus the initial
state of the system is given by: initim = hK0;System; Ái where K0 refers to the initial knowledge.
3.1 Operational semantics
In this part, we will introduce the semantic of agent and intruder rules respectively.
Agent Rules
The agent can compose and decompose pair terms in a message. A term can be encrypted if the
agent knows the encryption key, and an encrypted term can be decrypted if the agent knows the
corresponding decryption key. This is expressed by the knowledge inference operator, which is
dened inductively as follows (M is the set of terms).
t 2 M ) M ` t
M ` t1 V t1 = t2 ) M ` t2
M ` t1 V t1 ` t2 ) M ` (t1; t2)
M ` t V M ` k ) M ` ftgk
M ` ftgk
V
M ` k¡1 ) M ` t
M ` F(t) V M ` F¡1 ) M ` t
The process of learning information from a message is described as a function Learn : K £ A £
Message ! ST , where ST is set of terms and function ¡1 : Term ! Term yields the reverse
for a term as described before.
procedure Learn(K ; receiver ;m)
1 if (m 2 CSA);
2 return fmg;
3 if (m is (t1; t2))




5 if (m is (t1)t2) && K (receiver) ` t2¡1
6 return Learn(t1);
7 if (m is F(t1)) && K (receiver) ` F¡1
8 return Learn(t1);
Whenever a message is received, the receiver will decrypt the message (if he can), get the infor-
mation and update his knowledge. We implement this behavior as a procedure Update : K £
Message £A.
procedure Update(K ;message; agent)
1 S = K (agent);
2 T = Learn(K ; agent ;message);
3 foreach (i in T )
4 If (S 6` i)
5 S = S
S fig





where A is the condition and B is the conclusion. Whenever condition A is happened, B will be
red. The rule name is only the label for this rule.
The public send rule states that if a run executes a send event, the sent message is added to the buffer
and the executing run proceeds to the next event. The public read rule requires that the message pat-
tern specied in the read event should match any of the messages from the buffer. Upon execution
of the read event, this message is removed from the buffer, the knowledge of the trusted agents is
updated and the executing run advances to the next event.
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p = send(m);K (m:sender) ` m:term
[ public send ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K ;Q ;B Sfmg)
p = read(m);m 2 B
[ public read ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K 0;Q ;B n fmg);
K 0 = Update(K ;m;m:receiver)
The anonymous send and read rules are similar semantic with public send and read rules, except
that the information about sender is omitted.
p = asend(m);K (m:sender) ` m:term
[ anonymous send ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K ;Q ;B Sf( ;m:receiver ;m:term)g)
p = aread(m);m 2 B ;m:receiver =
[ anonymous read ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K 0;Q ;B n fmg);
K 0 = Update(K ;m;m:receiver)
The untappable send and read rule state the events which happen outside intruder control or even
intruder awareness. It thus limits the power of the intruder. In this case, the intruder does not learn
the communicated term for untappable send and read events. We do this in model generation stage:
the intruder behaviors are not generated corresponding with untappable messages.
p = usend(m);K (m:sender) ` m:term
[ untappable send ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K ;Q ;B Sfmg)
p = uread(m);m 2 B
[ untappable read ]
(K ; p ! Q ;B) p! (K 0;Q ;B n fmg);
K 0 = Update(K ;m;m:receiver)
The Start and Commit events are used to mark the start and nish signal of the session. They do
not change the knowledge of the participants K and buffer B.
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a1 2 A; a2 2 A; p = start(a1; a2)
[ start ]
(K ; p ! P ; B) p! (K ; P ; B)
a1 2 A; a2 2 A; p = commit(a1; a2)
[ commit ]
(K ; p ! P ; B) p! (K ; P ; B)
Intruder rules
To determine which message that the intruder can observe in the buffer B, we dene a function
In : Message £ B ! Boolean as:
procedure In(m;B)
1 foreach (m1 2 B);
2 if (m == m1)
3 return true;




Line 4 and line 5 in the above procedure represent the case that the message is sent and read via an
anonymous channel.
If the intruder has eavesdropping capabilities, as stated in the eavesdrop rule, he can learn the mes-
sage during transmission. The jam rule states that an intruder with the action capabilities can delete
any message from the output buffer. The difference of the deect rule is that the intruder can read
the message and add it to its knowledge. The inject rule describes the injection of any message
inferable from the intruder knowledge into the input buffer.
In(m;B); p = de°ect(m)
[ de°ect ]
(K ; p ! P ;B) p! (K 0;P ;B nm);
K 0 = Update(K ;m; intruder):
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K (intruder) ` m:term; p = inject(m)
[ inject ]
(K ; p ! P ;B) p! (K ;P ;B Sm)
In(m;B); p = eavesdrop(m)
[ eavesdrop ]
(K ; p ! P ;B) p! (K 0;P ;B 0);
K 0 = Update(K ;m; intruder)
In(m;B); p = jam(m)
[ jam ]
(K ; p ! P ;B) p! (K ;P ;B nm)
The operational semantics for other rules such as interleaving or choice are described in Appendix
B.
3.2 Model semantics
In this part, we will investigate on the formalization of privacy-type properties. The semantics of a
model are dened by a labeled transition system (LTS). Let §¿ denote the set of all events. Let §¤
be the set of nite traces.
Denition 5 (LTS) A LTS is a 3-tuple L = (S ; init ;T ) where S is a set of states, init 2 S is the
initial state, and T µ S £ §¿ £ S is a labeled transition relation.
For states s; s 0 2 S and e 2 §¿ , we write s e! s 0 to denote (s; e; s 0) 2 T . The set of enabled
events at s is enabled(s) = fe : §¿ j 9 s 0 2 S ; s e! s 0g. We write s e1;e2;¢¢¢;en! s 0 iff there exist
s1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sn+1 2 S such that si ei! si+1 for all 1 · i · n , s1 = s and sn+1 = s 0. Let tr : §¤ be a
sequence of events. s tr) s 0 if and only if there exist e1; e2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; en 2 §¿ such that s e1;e2;¢¢¢;en! s 0.
The set of traces of L is traces(L) = ftr : §¤ j 9 s 0 2 S ; init tr) s 0g.
Given a model composed of a process P and a set of knowledge K and the buffer B , we may
construct a LTS (S ; init ;T ) where S = fs j (K ;P ;B) !¤ sg, init = (K ;P ;B) and T =
f(s1; e; s2) : S £ §¿ £ S j s1 e! s2g using the operational semantics. The following denition
denes renement and equivalence relations.
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Denition 6 (Renement and Equivalence) Let Lim = (Sim ; initim ;Tim) be a LTS for an imple-
mentation. Let Lsp = (Ssp ; initsp ;Tsp) be a LTS for a specication. Lim renes Lsp , written as
Lim wT Lsp , iff traces(Lim) µ traces(Lsp). Lim equals Lsp in the trace semantics, written as
Lim ´ Lsp iff they rene each other.
In LTS model of security protocol, we also need to apply knowledge reasoning in verication:
during protocol run, an agent do not have knowledge about specic information. We capture this
semantic using the following denition of Unknown knowledge .
Denition 7 (Unknown knowledge) Let Lim = (Sim ; initim ;Tim) be a LTS for an implementa-
tion. Given an agent a and term t . t is unknown knowledge of agent a in the implementation, writ-
ten as UnknownKnowledge(Lim ; a; t) == true iff 8 tr = he1; e2; ::; eni 2 traces(Lim);8 i 2
f1::ngMtrei (a) 6` t1, whereM trei (a) is the knowledge of agent a of system following trace tr before
executing event ei .
Given an event e, process P , term x and x1, we denote e[x1=x ] is a new event which replaces all
occurrences of x in e by x1, and P [x1=x ] is the new process which replaces all occurrences of x
in P by x1. The function In(x ; e) is dened as: In(x ; e) = true if x occurs in event e, otherwise
In(x ; e) = false.
Denition 8 (Event renaming function) Let A be a set of terms, an event renaming function fA :
§! § is the function that satises:
² fA(e) = e[®=x ] if 9 x 2 A; In(x ; e) == true
² fA(e) = e if 8 x 2 A; In(x ; e) == false
where ® is an anonymous term and ® 62 A
The process fA(P) performs the event fA(e) whenever P perform e. We also have the notion of
reverse renaming function f ¡1A , where [] denotes for choice.
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² f ¡1A (e) = [ ]i=1::ne[xi=®] where A = fx1; x2:::; xng, if In(x ; ®) == true
² f ¡1A (e) = e, if In(x ; ®) == false
The process f ¡1A (P) perform any event from the set f
¡1
A (e) whenever P perform e.
Illustration of the denition. As an example, consider a simple voting protocol: there are two choices
of candidates corresponding two values of a vote v named: v1 and v2. The voter V sends collector
C his vote which is encrypted by public key of collector PkC . If the voter votes v1, the collector
will send the voter receipt r1, otherwise the collector sends receipt r2. The process represents the
voter will be:
Vote() = Vote[v1=v ] [ ] Vote[v2=v ]
= Send(V ;C ; fv1gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r1)! Skip;
[ ] Send(V ;C ; fv2gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r2)! Skip;
Let A = fv1; v2g, we have:
fA(Vote()) = Send(V ;C ; f®gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r1)! Skip;
[ ] Send(V ;C ; f®gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r2)! Skip;
f ¡1A (fA(Vote())) = Send(V ;C ; fv1gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r1)! Skip;
[ ] Send(V ;C ; fv1gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r2)! Skip;
[ ] Send(V ;C ; fv2gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r1)! Skip;
[ ] Send(V ;C ; fv2gPkC )! Read(C ;V ; r2)! Skip;
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3.3 Formalizing security properties
This part is devoted to introduce the formalization of security properties in LTS model. The prop-
erties examined in this study are: secrecy, authentication, anonymity, receipt freeness and coercion
resistance.
3.3.1 Secrecy property
The secrecy property concerns a message used by the protocol. The requirement is that the adversary
should not be able to derive the whole message or a part of message we want to keep secret. That
information may be leaked during the learning of the intruder: he gets the message, understands the
contents of the messages directly or using his private key to decrypt the message encrypted under
his public key.
For t 2 Term , r 2 A, we dene secret(t ; r) is the goal that information t is kept secret with agent
r during security protocols run.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Secrecy) Let Lim = (Sim ; initim ;Tim) be a LTS for the implementation: secret(t ; r) =
true , UnknownKnowledge(Lim ; r ; t) == true:
Proof: The proof is quite trivial, the information t is kept secret with agent r if and only if at every
state of the traces, r cannot have knowledge about t .
3.3.2 Authentication property
For r 2 AT , s 2 AT , we dene authentication(r ; s) is the goal that after execution the protocols
between r and s, r is assured that he actually nished the communication with s. Consider the
following process: P1 = start(s; r)! commit(r ; s) and LTS Lau = (S ; init ;T ) where S = fs j
(Á;P1; Á)!¤ sg, init = (Á;P1; Á) and T = f(s1; e; s2) : S £ §¿ £ S j s1 e! s2g.






Figure 3.3: Authentication checking
Theorem 3.3.2 (Authentication) Let Lsp = (Ssp ; initsp ;Tsp) be a LTS for the specication, authentication(r ; s) =
true , Lau wT Lsp :
Proof : A message-oriented approach to authentication is discussed in [31]. Authentication will
be captured in terms of events (generally transmission and receipt of particular messages) whose
occurrence guarantees the prior occurrence of other messages. r is assured that he just nished the
communication with s if and only if whenever we get the commit signal from r , we must get the
start signal from s beforehand. This authentication is illustrated by Figure 3.3.
3.3.3 Privacy-type properties
Our formal denitions of anonymity, receipt freeness and coercion resistance can be compared with
the work of Delaune et.al [8]. Whereas the authors in [8] give the denitions of these privacy prop-
erties in applied Pi-calculus using bisimulation checking, we dene them relying on observational
equivalence and knowledge inference. In both works, the ideas in anonymity checking are similar:
if the intruder cannot detect any differences when we swap the possible values of a term in protocol
runs, the anonymity on this term is satised. However, the receipt freeness and coercion resistance
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checking in our work and [8] are different. In [8], the authors model the fact that the agent and in-
truder exchange information by giving additional extended processes and contexts. However, their
denitions are not amenable to automation because they require universal quantication over an
innite set of contexts. In our denitions, we come up with a more natural way: the agents and
intruder have their own knowledge, and they can exchange their knowledge at the initial stage as
well as during protocol runs. The privacy checking turns out to be observational equivalence and
knowledge inference, which can be automatically checked using trace equivalence and knowledge
reasoning algorithms. In this section, we will give the formal denitions for three kinds of privacy.
The checking algorithms are given in Section 4.1.
Anonymity (Untraceability).
Let t is a term that the protocol will ensure the anonymity on it. Assuming t1 and t2 are two terms
representing different values of t . DenoteK0 is the initial knowledge of the protocol. Consider two
following contexts:
² The rst context represents the choice situation in term t : Systemim = System[t1=t ] []
System[t2=t ]. Let LTS Lim = (S1; initim ;T1) where initim = (K0;Systemim ; Á), S1 =
fs j initim !¤ sg and T1 = f(s1; e; s2) : S1£ §¿ £ S1 j s1 e! s2g.
² The second context applies renaming function: Systemsp = f ¡1ft1;t2g(fft1;t2g(Systemim)) and
LTS Lau = (S2; initau ;T2) where initau = (K0;Systemau ; Á), S2 = fs j initau !¤ sg
and T2 = f(s1; e; s2) : S2£ §¿ £ S2 j s1 e! s2g.
Denition 9 (Anonymity (Untraceability)) The protocol assures anonymity (or untraceability) on
term t if and only if: Lim ´ Lau .
This denition states that if every occurrence of t1 or t2 were renamed to new dummy value ®
(which is the situation in the process fft1;t2g(Systemim)), then whenever an event containing ®
is possible in this renamed process, any possible corresponding event containing t1 or t2 should
have been possible in the original process (this is assured by using reverse renaming function
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f ¡1ft1;t2g(fft1;t2g(Systemim))). The equation in traces means that at anytime t is replaced by t1
or t2, the intruder cannot observe any difference in traces and therefore cannot infer anything about
t .
Consider the illustration example of event renaming function given before. The traces of process
f ¡1A (fA(Vote())) are different traces toVote(). One of the traces it has is< Send(V ;C ; fv1gPkC );Read(C ;V ; r2) >
which is not possible for Vote(). This indicates that the occurrence of the event Read(C ;V ; r2)
allows a distinction to be made between different events contains v1; v2 and so this vote process
does not provide anonymity.
Receipt freeness.
Similar to anonymity, receipt freeness can be formalized using event renaming function. In addi-
tion, we need to model the fact that the agent is willing to share reliable secret information with
the intruder. We do it by changing the initial knowledge of the intruder: intruder's knowledge will
be added the initial knowledge of agents, except some privilege knowledge (such as private key) or
unreliable knowledge (such as the key of trap-door commitment scheme which the user can fake
whereas the intruder cannot detect). We call that initial knowledge is K1. Let t is a term that the
protocol ensures the receipt freeness on it. Assuming t1 and t2 are two terms representing different
values of t . Consider three following contexts:
² The rst context represents the choice situation in term t : Systemim = System[t1=t ] [ ]
System[t2=t ]. Let LTS Lim = (S1; initim ;T1) where initim = (K1;Systemim ; Á), S1 =
fs j initim !¤ sg and T1 = f(s1; e; s2) : S1£ §¿ £ S1 j s1 e! s2g.
² The second context applies renaming function: Systemsp = f ¡1ft1;t2g(fft1;t2g(Systemim)) and
LTS Lau = (S2; initau ;T2) where initau = (K1; Systemau ; Á), S2 = fs j initau !¤ sg
and T2 = f(s1; e; s2) : S2£ §¿ £ S2 j s1 e! s2g.
² The third context represents the situation in which the agent sends t1: Systemt1 = System[t1=t ]
and LTS Lt1 = (S3; initt1;T3) where initt1 = (K1;Systemt1; Á), S3 = fs j initt1 !¤ sg
and T3 = f(s1; e; s2) : S3£ §¿ £ S3 j s1 e! s2g.
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Denition 10 (Receipt freeness) The protocol assures receipt freeness on term t if and only if two
following conditions are hold:
1. Lim ´ Lau :
2. UnknownKnowledge(Lt1; intruder ; t1) == true:
The rst condition is similar to the anonymity condition: the intruder cannot tell the difference in
traces when t is replaced by t1 and t2. The second condition gives the situation when the agent
wants to fake the intruder: while the agent tells the intruder that he sent t2, he actually sent t1. The
receipt freeness property is hold if the intruder, with all reliable knowledge the agent supply, cannot
detect that the agent is sending t1.
Coercion resistance.
Coercion resistance is a strongest property as we give the intruder the ability to communicate inter-
actively with the agent. In this model, the intruder can prepare the messages that he wants the agent
to send.
Let t is a term that the protocol ensures the coercion resistance on it. Assuming t1 and t2 are two
terms representing different values of t . We specify the initial knowledge of agent and intruder in
this case as: intruder's knowledge is all terms need to generate all messages in the sessions, whereas
agent's knowledge is only messages corresponding to the session which t is replaced by t1 and t2
supplied by intruder. We call that system's initial knowledge is K2. Consider another case: the
intruder knows and wants to send t2, so he supplies all the necessary messages for agent to send in
this way; however, he does not know about t1. On the contrary, the agent, who bases on information
supplied by intruder, knows t1 but may not know how to construct the protocol messages to send
t1 . We call that system's initial knowledge is K3. Consider three following contexts:
² The rst context represents the choice situation in term t : Systemim = System[t1=t ] [ ]
System[t2=t ] and LTS Lim = (S1; initim ;T1) where initim = (K2;Systemim ; Á), S1 =
fs j initim !¤ sg and T1 = f(s1; e; s2) : S1£ §¿ £ S1 j s1 e! s2g.
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² The second context applies renaming function: Systemsp = f ¡1ft1;t2g(fft1;t2g (Systemim)) and
LTS Lau = (S2; initau ;T2) where initau = (K2;Systemau ; Á), S2 = fs j initau !¤ sg
and T2 = f(s1; e; s2) : S2£ §¿ £ S2 j s1 e! s2g.
² The third context represents the situation in which the agent sends t1: Systemt1 = System[t1=t ]
and LTS Lt1 = (S3; initt1;T3) where initt1 = (K3;Systemt1; Á), S3 = fs j initt1 !¤ sg
and T3 = f(s1; e; s2) : S3£ §¿ £ S3 j s1 e! s2g.
Denition 11 (Coercion resistance) The protocol assures coercion resistance on term t if and only
if two following conditions are hold:
1. Lim ´ Lau :
2. UnknownKnowledge(Lt1; intruder ; t1) == true:
The rst condition is similar to the anonymity condition: the intruder cannot tell the difference
in traces when t is replaced by t1 and t2. The second condition enables us to reason about the
coercer's choice of t : while intruder force the agent to send t2 by supplying all necessary messages,
the agent successfully fake intruder by sending t1.
These two conditions look like similar with conditions of receipt freeness property. However, there
are differences in the initial knowledge of participants. In case of coercion resistance, the agent's
knowledge is constituted from the whole messages supplied by the intruder; moreover, the intruder
knows how to generate them whereas the agent may not. In case of receipt freeness, the agent knows
how to generate those messages and the intruder's knowledge is only supplied reliable information
carried out by agents.
Chapter 4
Algorithm and Implementation
In this chapter, we will represent the algorithms used in verication of security properties. The
architecture and implementation of SeVe module are also briey introduced.
4.1 Verication algorithms
In privacy checking, we come up an algorithm for checking the trace equivalence. Let Spec =
(Ssp ; initsp ;Tsp) be a specication and Impl = (Sim ; initim ;Tim) be an implementation, the
checking of trace equivalence is dened as in Fig 4.1, where re¯ne is denoted for renement check-
ing function. In this paper, we follow the on-the-y renement checking algorithm in [21], which
is based on the renement checking algorithms in FDR [30] but applies partial order reduction.
To check theUnknown Knowledge relation, we apply the Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm. The
algorithm for Unknown Knowledge checking is presented in Fig. 4.1. In line 6, s2:V (agent) is
the knowledge of agent at state s2. Note that the operator ` is recursively calculated as in Chapter
3.1. In this algorithm, we recorded all the visited states to detect the loop in traces (line 5).
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procedure Equivalence(Impl ;Spec)
1: if (re¯ne(Impl ;Spec) == true




procedure Unknown Knowledge(Impl ; agent ; term)
1: visited :push(initim);
2: while visited 6= ? do
3: s1 := visited :pop();
4: foreach (s2 2 enabled(s1))
5: if (s2 62 visited)








Figure 4.1: Algorithm: Equivalent and Unknown knowledge functions
4.2 Implementation: SeVe module
Model checker PAT1 (Process Analysis Toolkit) is designed to apply state-of-the-art model check-
ing techniques for system analysis. PAT [39] [23] [22] [24] supports a wide range of modeling
1http://www.patroot.com
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SeVe compiler









Verification output to user
Figure 4.2: SeVe architecture
languages. The verication features of PAT are abundant in that on-the-y renement checking
algorithm is used to implement Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) based verication, partial order re-
duction is used to improve verication efciency, and LTL based verication supports both event
and state checking. Furthermore, PAT has been enhanced for verifying properties such as deadlock
freeness, divergence freeness, timed renement, temporal behaviors, etc [40] [38] [41] [37].
With all of these advantages, we have implemented the ideas of privacy checking into a SeVe module
of PAT model checker. Fig.4.2 shows the architecture design of SeVe module with ve components.
The security protocols are specied using SeVe language. The Intruder behavior generator will
automatically generate all the possible attacks of the intruder using Dolev-Yao model. The SeVe
compiler will compile all those behaviors of protocols into SeVe processes, of which operational
semantics are dened in Chapter 3.1. These processes are then transmitted to LTS Generator, which
generates the Labeled Transition System (LTS) semantic model. This model can be passed to the
Simulator or Model checker for simulating behaviors or verifying security properties, respectively.
The counter example, if exists, will be showed visually by Simulator.
The SeVe language can be considered as the extension of Casper languages [12]; however, we
have some amelioration. Firstly, we support many kinds of property checking (anonymity, receipt
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freeness, coercion resistance etc.) for different security purposes. The user also does not need to
specify the behavior of the intruder, which is very complicated. By observing the general intruder
behavior as in Dolev-Yao model, the generator will automatically generate all possible attacks of
the intruder. The intruder ability is also parameterized, so the user can describe the capability of
intruder corresponding to different situation. The full grammar of SeVe language is in Appendix A.
To illustrate the language, the SeVe specication of Needham Schroeder public key protocol and
Fujioka et al. protocol, which we will examine in Chapter 5, are given in Appendix C.
Chapter 5
CaseStudy
This chapter shows two case studies about security verication using SeVe approach: Needham
Schroeder public key protocol with authentication property, and Fujioka et.al electronic voting pro-
tocol with privacy property.
5.1 Needham Schroeder public key protocol
5.1.1 Description and the model in LTS
In this part, we will examine the Needham Schroeder public key protocol, which was described
in Chapter 2. The SeVe description for this protocol is given in Appendix C. In this section, we
examine the inside processes of the model.
Each of the three messages in Needham Schroeder protocol is sent by one agent and received by
another. The view that each process has the running protocol is the sequences of sent and received
messages are following:
A's view:
Message 1: A sends to B: fA;NAgpkB
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Message 2: A gets from B: fNA;NBgpkA
Message 3: A sends to B: fNBgpkB
B's view:
Message 1: B gets from A: fA;NAgpkB
Message 2: B sends to A: fNA;NBgpkA
Message 3: B gets from A: fNBgpkB
SeVe tool can automatically translate protocol description in SeVe language to LTS model, which is
suitable for the model checker. For example, below are the processes represent the communication
between A and B :
AgentA(B) = Start(A;B)
! send(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )
! read(B ;A; fNA;NBgpkA)
! send(A;B ; fNBgpkB )
! commit(A;B)! Skip();
AgentB(A) = Start(B ;A)
! read(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )
! send(B ;A; fNAmNBgpkA)
! read(A;B ; fNBgpkB )
! commit(B ;A)! Skip();
In Dolev-Yao model, the intruder I is also an agent; therefore, we have other processes represent
the communication between A, B and I . However, for briey, they are not given here.
To automatically generate the intruder behaviors, we notice that: although the intruder can fake or
learn anything he can, it is only useful if the intruder manipulated information from the communica-
tion between trusted agents. He also needs to fake only messages which can be used to deceive the
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agents, i.e messages from trusted agents communication. Hence, we generate the intruder behav-
iors based on messages sent between trusted agents. For example, for the rst message in Needham
Schroeder protocol, we can generates some behaviors for the intruder with de°ect and inject ability
as:
Intruder() = de°ect(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )! Intruder
[ ] inject(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )! Intruder
:::::::::::
where [ ] denoted for choice (see Appendix B). Each of above behaviors presents one ability of
intruder. The model including behavior of roles, and each role is the sequential execution of rules.
The system is the interleaving of behaviors of agent A, agent B and intruder I :
System(vt) = AgentA(B) jjj AgentB(A) jjj AgentA(I ) jjj ::: jjj Intruder();
5.1.2 Analysis
Before analyzing the protocols, we need to specify the initial knowledge of the participants. The
initial knowledge of each participant in this protocol includes: the identier and public key of all
participants, his own private key and nonce.
² A's knowledge: V (V ) = fA;B ; I ;NA; pkA; pk¡1A ; pkB ; pkI g.
² B's knowledge: V (A) = fA;B ; I ;NB ; pkB ; pk¡1B ; pkA; pkI g.
² Intruder's knowledge: V (I ) = fA;B ; I ;NI ; pkI ; pk¡1I ; pkA; pkBg.
Authentication of A by B
To verify the authentication of A by B , we check the fact that: whenever the event commit(B ;A)
happens, the event start(A;B) has occurred beforehand. The SeVe tool returns a counter example
for this assertion:
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Figure 5.1: Counter example of authentication checking
< send(A; I ; fA;NAgpkI )! de°ect(A; I ; fA;NAgpkI )! inject(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )! read(A;B ; fA;NAgpkB )!
send(B ;A; fNA;NBgpkB ) ! de°ect(B ;A; fNA;NBgpkB ) ! inject(I ;A; fNA;NBgpkA) !
read(I ;A; fNA;NBgpkA)! send(A; I ; fNBgpkI )! de°ect(A; I ; fNBgpkI )! inject(A;B ; fNBgpkB )!
read(A;B ; fNBgpkB )! commit(B ;A) >
This counter example is represented as in Figure 5.1. It shows that the intruder can successfully
delude B by pretending that he is A.
Authentication of B by A
Similarly, we can verify the authentication of B by A by checking the fact that: whenever the event
commit(A;B) happens, the event start(B ;A) has occurred beforehand. The SeVe tool returns
valid result, meaning that the protocol satisfy the authentication of B by A.
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5.2 Electronic voting protocol of Fujioka et al.
5.2.1 Description
In this part, we study a protocol due to Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [4]. The protocol involves
voters, an administrator, verifying that only eligible voters can cast votes, and a collector, collect-
ing and publishing the votes. The protocol uses some unusual cryptographic primitives such as
blind signatures. In a rst phase, the voter gets a signature on a commitment to his vote from the
administrator.
1. Voter V selects a vote vt and computes the commitment x = fvtgr using a random key r ;
2. V computes the message e = ª(x ; b) using a blinding function ª and a random blinding
factor b;
3. V digitally signs e and sends her signature sV (e) to the administrator A;
4. A veries that V has the right to vote and the signature is valid; if all these tests hold, A
digitally signs e and sends his signature sA(e) to V ;
5. V now unblinds sA(e) and obtains y = sA(x ), a signed commitment to V 0s vote.
The second phase of the protocol is the actual voting phase.
1. V sends y , A's signature on the commitment to V 's vote, to the collector C ;
2. C checks the correctness of the signature y and, if the test succeeds, records x and y ;
3. V sends r to C via an untappable channel;
4. C decrypts x using r to get the vote vt ;
The SeVe description for Lee et al. protocol is given in Appendix C. In next part, we will examine
the LTS model of this protocol.
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5.2.2 The model in LTS
To model blind signature, we consider the following equation:
ª¡1(fª(x ; b)gsA; b) = fxgsV
Voter. The voter interacts with administrator and counter during protocol runs by sending and
receiving messages. The digital signature of administrator is checked in read event: the message the
voter read must be matched with the message he is waiting. Moreover, because voter's knowledge
contains the public key of administrator, he can only decrypt and get information from message
signed by administrator's signature key.
Voter(vt) = send(V ;A; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV )! read(A;V ; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA)
! send(V ;C ; ffvtgrgsA)! usend(V ;C ; r)! Skip();
Administrator. Similarly, bases on administrator's knowledge of voter's public key, the adminis-
trator can check the signature key of voter via read event.
Admin(vt) = read(V ;A; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV )
! send(A;V ; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA)! Skip();
Counter. The counter gets the messages from voter, checks the correctness of signature and de-
crypts messages to get the vote.
Counter(vt) = read(V ;C ; ffvtgrgsA)! uread(V ;C ; r)! Skip();
Intruder. For privacy checking of this protocol, the intruder's ability is eavesdropping. That is, he
can observe the passing messages and tries to get the information with his knowledge (except the
last message of protocol as it is sent via an untappable channel).
Intruder(vt) = eavesdrop(V ;A; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV )! Skip()
[ ] eavesdrop(A;V ; fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA)! Skip()
[ ] eavesdrop(V ;C ; ffvtgrgsA)! Skip()
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System. The system is the interleaving of agent, administrator, counter and intruder processes:
System(vt) = Voter(vt) jjj Admin(vt) jjj Counter(vt) jjj Intruder(vt);
5.2.3 Analysis
Let vt1; vt2 is two values of vote vt .
Anonymity: In anonymity checking, we model the initial knowledge of participants as: the voter,
administrator and counter have all knowledge to generate and decrypt the messages, whereas the
intruder only knows public information such as participant's names, public keys. Note that sA¡1,
reverse key of administrator's signature key sA, is public key of administrator and is published to
everyone. It happens similarly with sA¡1 and sA.
² Voter's knowledge: V (V ) = fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg.
² Administrator's knowledge: V (A) = fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g.
² Counter's knowledge: V (C ) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g.
² Intruder's knowledge: V (Intruder) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g.
SeVe tool returns true in checking the equality of two traces in anonymity condition. It means that
the protocol ensures the anonymity property.
Receipt freeness: In this case, besides the public information, the intruder has some information
which the voter shares. In this protocol, that information is ª¡1, b and r .
² Voter's knowledge: V (V ) = fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg.
² Administrator's knowledge: V (A) = fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g.
² Counter's knowledge: V (C ) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g.
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² Intruder's knowledge: V (Intruder) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1;ª;ª¡1; b; rg.
Using SeVe tool to check the conditions of receipt freeness, we have a counter example. By ob-
serving it, we nd that the second condition of receipt freeness is not satised: by unblinding the
rst message, the intruder can trace which vote corresponds to this particular voter. Therefore, if
the voter tells the intruder he votes v2 (whereas he actually votes v1), the intruder can decrypt the
rst message and detect v1. Moreover, the voter cannot lie about the values of r and b as this will
be detected immediately by the intruder.
Coercion resistance: Because the rst condition in coercion resistance is checked similarly with
anonymity, we omit it here. Consider the second condition of coercion resistance, which is corre-
sponding to the third context. In this context, the intruder has all information to generate messages,
which are used to vote vt2. He supplies all those messages to the voter. The voter, in other hand,
bases on that information, tries to vote vt1 and deceives the intruder.
² Voter's knowledge: V (V ) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ; vt1;ª;ª¡1;
fª(fvt2gr ; b)gsV ; ffvt2grgsA; rg.
² Administrator's knowledge: V (A) = fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g.
² Counter's knowledge: V (C ) = fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g.
² Intruder's knowledge: V (Intruder) = fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg.
The protocol does not satisfy the coercion resistance as the SeVe tool returns a counter example
when checking the second condition. The reason is that at the beginning state, the intruder knows
about b and r , so he can trace whatever the voter votes.
5.3 Experiments and comparison
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our SeVe tool using some classical security protocols
in literature. Figure 5.3 shows the comparison of SeVe tool with other 3 recent popular tools:
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OFMC, Casper/FDR and ProVerif. . The rst column is the name of the protocol. The last four
columns are the time needed to check the protocol. The experiments are running in Computer with
Core 2 Duo CPU E6550 2.33Ghz and 4Gb RAM.
Protocol SeVe OFMC Casper/FDR ProVerif
Needham Public Key 0.015s 0.031s 0.008s 0.019s
Andrew Secure RPC 0.227s 0.376s 0.313s 0.293s
Denning Saco 0.032s 0.101s 0.083s 0.041s
Lowe modied Denning 0.046s 0.146s 0.11s 0.052s
Otway-Rees 0.037s 0.12s 0.040s 0.041s
Wide-Mouthed Frog 0.011s 0.032s 0.013s 0.025s
Yahalom 0.027s 0.081s 0.019s 0.032s
Woo-Lam 0.019s 0.038s 0.016s 0.022s
Woo-Lam Mutual Auth. 0.085s 0.137s 0.091s 0.103s
Needham Conventional Key 0.041s 0.105s 0.036s 0.067s
Kao Chow Auth. 0.073s 0.159s 0.104s 0.116s
Kehne Langendor-Schoenw 0.488s 0.223s 0.140s 0.198s
TMN 0.351s 0.177s 0.236s 0.228s
Gong's Mutual Auth. 0.690s 0.204s 0.311s 0.294s
Figure 5.2: Experiment results on some security protocols
From Figure 5.3, we can see that the SeVe tool has better performance than OFMC and ProVerif
in protocols not related to algebra operators. SeVe's performance is not as well as Casper/FDR in
small size protocols; however, SeVe outperforms Casper/FDR in larger size protocols. This can be
explained as in PAT tools and SeVemodule, we applied many optimization techniques such as partial
order reduction and lazy intruder model, in both generation and verication phases. Nevertheless,
SeVe tool underperforms OFMC, ProVerif and Casper/FDR in protocols related algebra operators.
This is because in SeVe, we do not support these operators in language semantic. Therefore, we
need to encode them as dened function, which take time in verication. As the conclusion of the
experimental results, SeVe shows the potential in verifying large scale protocols, which is crucial in
practical use.
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SeVe tool also successfully check other well-known protocols such as "A Fair Non-Repudiation
Protocol" [16], "Computer-assisted verication of a protocol for certied email" [1] (these protocols
require the checking of participant's knowledge, those which are not supported by other tools). This
shows that SeVe has the ability in applying for a wide range of security protocols checking.
Protocol Property #States #Transitions Time(s) #Result Auto in [8]
Fujioka et al.
Anonymity 356 360 0.117s true yes
Receipt freeness 138 141 0.053s false no
Coercion resistance 97 104 0.040s false no
Okamoto et al.
Anonymity 484 492 0.133s true yes
Receipt freeness 606 611 0.158s true no
Coercion resistance 131 136 0.068s false no
Lee et al.
Anonymity 1744 1810 0.715s true yes
Receipt freeness 2107 2265 0.849s true no
Coercion resistance 2594 2673 0.930s true no
Figure 5.3: Experimental results on three electronic voting protocols
We also demonstrate SeVe tools with 3 test cases of electronic voting protocols from literature:
protocol of Fujioka et al. [4], protocol due to Okamoto et al. [26] and protocol based on the Lee et
al. [20]. These protocols were demonstrated in [8]. However, the reasoning task is mainly carried
out by hand in that paper. We prove that we can verify these protocols in a fully automatic way. The
user can easily specify these protocols using SeVe language and verify privacy types properties by
just one click, without any hand-proving step. These protocols specications and the SeVe tool can
be downloaded in [44]. The last column represents the automatic verier ability of the approach in
[8] dealing with the corresponding protocol. The experimental results show that the SeVe tool have
the ability in automatic checking privacy-related security protocols. In the best of our knowledge,
SeVe tool is the rst tool which support automatic verication for receipt freeness and coercion
resistance properties.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future work
6.1 Conclusion
Along with the rapid development of network transaction, the verication of security protocol be-
comes more and more important. Different with other security verier tools which mainly focus on
secrecy and authentication properties, we aim to develop an automatic tool that can verify as many
as types of security goals.
In this paper, we have introduced a framework for modeling security protocols using LTS semantics
model. To enhance the ability of verication, we embed the knowledge of participants inside the
model, as well as parameterize the intruder abilities for different specication purposes. Within
this framework, we have formally dened the secrecy property, authentication property and three
kinds of privacy-types properties: anonymity, receipt freeness and coercion resistance, based on
observational equivalence and knowledge inference. We also come up some verication algorithms
to verify these properties.
Whereas other previous studies about privacy checking based mainly on hand-proving, our approach
is automatic in receipt freeness and coercion resistance checking: the user only need to specify
the protocol in SeVe language, the verication will be automatically run and return the counter
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example,if exist, to the user. This makes the privacy verication more reliable and avoids errors.
Moreover, by using automatic approach, we can verify larger system, which is crucial in practical
use.
The results of this thesis are embodied in the implementation of a SeVe module in PAT model
checker, which supports specifying, simulating and verifying security protocols for different type of
security goals. The experimental results on some classical security protocols prove that our tool can
compare with other current tools in some aspects.
6.2 Limitation and future work
Our approach has some limitations. Firstly, SeVe tool currently cannot verify unbounded number
of sessions or an unbounded number of voters. To do it in future work, we need a technique to
abstract those parameters before verication. Secondly, some cryptography terms and algebra prop-
erties such as Dife-Hellman and Exclusive-or operators are also out of scope of current research.
In the future work, we will extend the SeVe language, add some other operational semantics and
verication algorithms to be able to verify protocols related to them. We also try to apply other
optimization techniques to enhance the ability of our tool in verifying large system.
We also propose some other future work directions as follows:
² Apply and extend the SeVe framework to verify other security protocols such as integrity,
non-repudiation and fairness.
² Adapt the tool to verify not only for security protocols but also for other security systems such
as protocols in network layers.
² Apply the SeVe framework, especially the intruder model, to other verication domain, such
as sensor network and web service.
² Extend the animation part in current tool for better visualization in both specication and
verication stage.
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Appendix A
SeVe syntax
In this part, we present the formal syntax of SeVe language. We use EBNF, key words in bold term;
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Declaration section
Variables declare ::= [Timestamps: List Id ]
[Time allow: Number ]
Agents: List Id
[Nonces: List Id ]
[Public keys: List Id ]
[Server keys: List ServerKey ]
[Signature keys: List Id ]
[Session keys: List Id ]
[Constants: List Id ]
[Functions: List Id ]
Function declare ::= Id = Id
j Id = Id ;Function declare
List Id ::= Id
j Id ;List Id
List ServerKey ::= fList Idg of Id
j fList Idg of Id ;List ServerKey
Initial knowledge section
Initial declare ::= Id knows fmsgg
j Id knows fmsgg; Initial declare
Protocol description section
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Protocol declare ::= Id ! Id : message
j Id ! Id : message;
Protocol declare




j Id(msg) %function declare
Actual system section
System declare ::= ListAgent
[Repeat:number ]
ListAgent ::= Id : List Id
Id : List Id ;ListAgent
Intruder section
Intruder declare ::= Intruder: Id
[Intruder knowledge: msg ]
[Intruder prepare: msg ]
[Intruder ability: List ability ]
List ability ::= [Inject]; [Deect]; [Eavesdrop]; [Jam]
Verication section
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Veri¯cation declare ::= [Data secrecy: list secrecy ]
[Authentication: list auth]
[Anonymity: Id ]
[Receipt freeness: Id ]
[Coercion resistance: Id ]
list secrecy ::= msg1 of Id
j msg1 of Id ; list secrecy
list auth ::= Id is authenticated with Id [usingfIdg]
j Id is authenticated with Id [usingfmsgg]; list auth
Basic denition
Identi¯er ::= letterfletter j digitg¤
Number ::= 010::090 digit¤




In this part, we introduce the semantics of other operational rules: choice, interleaving, parallel and
sequence.
[ Skip ]
(V ; Skip; B) X! (V ; Stop; B)
(V ; P ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0; B 0)
[ choice1 ]
(V ; P [] Q ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0 [] Q ; B 0)
(V ; Q ; B)
p! (V 0; Q 0; B 0)
[ choice2 ]
(V ; P [] Q ; B)
p! (V 0; P [] Q 0; B 0)
(V ; P ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0; B 0)
[ interleave1 ]
(V ; P jjj Q ; B) p! (V 0; P 0 jjj Q ; B 0)
(V ; Q ; B)
p! (V 0; Q 0; B 0)
[ interleave2 ]
(V ; P jjj Q ; B) p! (V 0; P jjj Q 0; B 0)
[ interleave3 ]
(V ; Skip jjj Skip; B) p! (V ; Stop; B)
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(V ; P ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0; B 0) V p 62 PQ [ paralle1 ]
(V ; P k Q ; B) p! (V 0; P 0 k Q ; B 0)
(V ; P ; B)
p! (V ; P 0; B) V (V ; Q ; B) p! (V ; Q 0; B)
[ parallel2 ]
(V ; P k Q ; B) p! (V ; P 0 k Q 0; B)
(V ; P ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0; B 0)
[ sequence1 ]
(V ; P ; Q ; B)
p! (V 0; P 0; Q ; B 0)
(V ; P ; B) X! (V 0; P 0; B 0)
[ sequence2 ]
(V ; P ; Q ; B) ¿! (V 0; P 0; Q ; B 0)
Appendix C
SeVe specication of security protocols
C.1 Needham Schroeder public key protocol
#Variables
Agents : a; b;
Nonces : na;nb;
Public keys : ka; kb;
#Initial
a knows fna; kag;
b knows fnb; kbg;
#Protocol description
a ! b : fa;nagkb;
b ! a : fna;nbgka;
a ! b : fnbgkb;
59





Intruder : I ;
#Veri¯cation
Data secrecy : fnag of Alice;
Agent authentication : Alice is authenticated with Bob using fag;
Bob is authenticated with Alice using fbg;
C.2 Electronic voting protocol of Fujioka et al.
Anonymity checking
#Variables
Agents : V ;A;C ;
Signature keys : sV ; sA;
Constants : vt ; r ; b;
Function : ª;
#Initial
V knows fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg;
A knows fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g;
C knows fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g;
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#Protocol description
V ! A : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV ;
A! V : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA;
V ! C : ffvtgrgsA;
V ! C : r ;
#Intruder
Intruder knowledge : V ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1;ª;ª¡1;
#Function declare
ª¡1(fª(x ; b)gsA; b) = fxgsV ;
#Veri¯cation
Anonymity : vt ;
Receipt freeness checking
#Variables
Agents : V ;A;C ;
Signature keys : sV ; sA;
Constants : vt ; r ; b;
Function : ª;
#Initial
V knows fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg;
A knows fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g;
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C knows fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g;
#Protocol description
V ! A : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV ;
A! V : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA;
V ! C : ffvtgrgsA;
V ! C : r ;
#Intruder
Intruder knowledge : V ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1;ª;ª¡1; b; r ;
#Function declare
ª¡1(fª(x ; b)gsA; b) = fxgsV ;
#Veri¯cation
Receipt freeness : vt ;
Coercion resistance checking
#Variables
Agents : V ;A;C ;
Signature keys : sV ; sA;
Constants : vt ; r ; b;
Function : ª;
#Initial
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V knows fV ;A;C ; sV ; sA¡1; vt1; vt2;ª;ª¡1; b; rg;
A knows fV ;A;C ; sA; sV ¡1g;
C knows fV ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1g;
#Protocol description
V ! A : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsV ;
A! V : fª(fvtgr ; b)gsA;
V ! C : ffvtgrgsA;
V ! C : r ;
#Intruder
Intruder knowledge : V ;A;C ; sA¡1; sV ¡1;ª;ª¡1; b; r ;
#Function declare
ª¡1(fª(x ; b)gsA; b) = fxgsV ;
#Veri¯cation
Coercion resistance : vt ;
